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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues for the establishment of a tort of invasion of privacy in ew 
Zealand. This tort shall provide sufficient protection of privacy interests. This 
protection cannot be achieved by developing the already existing remedies. 
Moreover it supports the invention of a six step-test to protect the privacy of 
children. This test was proposed by the appellants in the Hosking case in the 
Court of Appeal. 
Therefore, the paper introduces the German law of privacy and compares the 
level of protection achieved in Germany and New Zealand. The German law of 
privacy depends on the right to one's personality and the right to control one's 
own image. The paper compares this system with the New Zealand system and 
makes proposals, how this level of protection can be achieved in New Zealand. 
IV 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Hosking case the question arose whether the New Zealand law 
provides sufficient protection for privacy interests . While a tort of invasion of 
privacy seemed to be widely accepted, Randerson J disagreed with this opinion 
in his judgment. Therefore there is still the question if the New Zealand legal 
system should provide a special remedy for invasion of privacy. The Hosking 
case is dealing with the privacy of children of celebrities in particular, but one 
can consider the issue in a broader context and discuss the question how privacy 
interests should be treated in the New Zealand law . 
Nevertheless, the issue of privacy of children is one of particular con-
cern and will be addressed in this paper in detail. The appellants argued for the 
establishment of a tort of unauthorised invasion of privacy of children by publi-
cation of photographs depicting these children. Therefore, they proposed a six-
step test. This test shall answer the question under which circumstances the pub-
lication of photographs depicting children may be allowed. The key issues of 
this test are the consent of the parents, the impact of freedom of expression and 
the best interests of the child. 
This paper examines the issue of the protection of privacy in the New 
Zealand legal system and the question if the proposed six-step test fits in this 
system. It presents the German law of privacy and the system which protects 
privacy interests in Germany. In particular, it introduces the case of Caroline of 
Monaco and the way the protection of privacy of children was developed in this 
case. It examines the findings of Randerson J in the Hosking case in-depth and 
compares the level of privacy protection in New Zealand and Germany. 
The paper argues for the establishment of a tort of invasion of privacy at 
least by the disclosure of private facts. It disagrees with the opinion of Rander-
son J that privacy interests are protected sufficiently by the existing common 
law torts. It does not support the opinion that the existing remedies could be 
developed in a way that they provide sufficient protection of privacy interests, 
since they are designed to protect different interests, which do not cover neces-
sarily all privacy interests. Moreover it recognises that the issue of protection of 
privacy of children is of particular importance. Thus it supports the proposed 
six-step test in the context of the publication of private information about chil-
dren. This six-step test develops the protection of the privacy of children to a 
degree comparable to the German approach. This paper explains how this test 
fits in the New Zealand legal framework. 
II. THE LAW OF PRIVACY IN GERMANY 
The German Jaw of privacy is based on the general right to one's per-
sonality. This general right of personality is founded on Article 2 (1) and Article 
1 (1) of the German Basic Law. 1 Article 2 (1) states:2 
Article 2 (Right of liberty) 
( !) Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality 
in so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the con-
stitutional order or the moral code. 
This general right to the free development of one's personality is to read in con-
text of Article l (1) of the German Basic Law:3 
Article 1 (Protection of human dignity) 
(I) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and to protect it shall 
be the duty of all state authority. 
Upon the principle of the free development of one's personality and the princi-
ple of human dignity the German Federal Court of Justice established the gen-
eral right to one's personality and held: 4 
Moreover, now that the Basic Law has recognised the right of a human be-
ing to have hi s dignity respected, and also the right to free development of 
1 BVerfG [2000] 14 NJW, 1021. 
z German Basic Law, Article 2 (!). 
3 German Basic Law, Article I (I). 
4 BGHZ 13, 334. 
2 
his personality as a private right, to be universally respected in so far as it 
does not infringe another person 's right or is not in conflict with the consti-
tutional order or morality, the general personality must be regarded as a 
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right. 
A. The Horizontal impact of human rights and fundamental freedoms on 
the German private law 
When the Federal Constitutional Court established the right to one's 
personality as a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, there is still the 
question in which situations this right applies. As Article 1 (3) of the German 
Basic Law states:5 
Article 1 
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive, and 
the judiciary as directly applicable law. 
This general rule establishes a direct application of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms on legal relationships between private parties and public authori-
ties. It does not mention an application of these rights to legal relationships be-
tween two private parties. This is due to the fact that the human rights that are 
guaranteed in the Basic Law are established as "defensive rights designed to 
protect the individual from arbitrary state interference."6 Since the significance 
of these rights as an objective order of values is broader than just a protection 
against state interference, the application of human rights and fundamental free-
doms has to be read in another meaning.7 As an objective value order, the basic 
rights catalogue of the Basic Law applies to all parts of law: 8 
This value order, which has at its centre the dignity of the human personal-
ity that freely develops in the soc ial community, is, as a fundamental consti-
tutional decision valid in all areas of law. 
5 German Basic Law, Article 1 (3). 
6 Nigel Foster/ Satish Sule German Legal System and Laws (3'd eel, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2002) 205. 
7 Ingo von MUnch Grwzdgesetz. - Kommenta r (5th eel, Verlag CH Beck, Mi.inchen, 2000) 39. 
8 BVerfGE 7, 198. 
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Since the basic rights bind the courts as part of the judiciary, they have to con-
sider these rights in their decision:9 
The judge is under a constitutional obligation to examine whether the sub-
stantive private law provisions he has to apply are influenced by basic rights 
described in the sense above; if this is the case he has to take account of the 
resulting modifications of private law when interpreting and applying these 
provisions. 
This rule establishes the so-called Third-Party-Impact of basic rights. This 
means an indirect horizontal impact of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
set out in the Basic Law on legal relationships of private parties. The basic 
rights do not apply directly on these cases, but the courts have to consider basic 
rights issues when they occur. 
B. The Protection of the right to one's personality in the Gennan Civil 
Code 
The right to one's personality, which is based on provisions of the Ger-
man Basic Law, is also protected in the German Civil Code: 10 
Section 823 (Duty to compensate for damage) 
( I) A person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, 
health, freedom, property or other rights of another is bound to compensate 
him for any damage arising there from. 
In this context the right to one's personality is 'another right' and it is therefore 
protected by section 823, para l of the German Civil Code. Besides damages, 
which can be granted directly on the ground of section 823, para 1, a court can 
commit the defendant to publish a counterstatement and it can grant an injunc-
tion in conjunction with section 1004, para 2 of the German Civil Code. 11 
9 BVerfGE 7, 198. 
10 German Civil Code, section 823, para I. 
11 Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (60'h ed, Beck, Muenchen, 2001) p 963. 
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The fundamental right to one's personality includes two kinds .12 On the 
one hand it protects the passive right of a person to be left alone, and on the 
other hand it protects the active right to make one's own decisions and to 
choose actions and the way of life independent from influences by other per-
sons. The right to be left alone means a global protection of the private sphere, 
which includes everyone's right to a private home, which must not be breached 
by another one. Generally, this passive right to personality protects the person 
from the disclosure of private facts. 13 The active right to personality protects the 
freedom of individuals to decide what they want to do with themselves and their 
life. This right covers the freedom to make social and economical arrangements, 
including the economical exploitation of the own personality. Thus, names, 
spoken words, writings, other artistic works and the control of one's own image 
are protected by the general right to one's personality against the interference by 
another one. In the case of a breach of the passive and the active right to one's 
personality one can sue for damages on the grounds of section 823, para l of the 
German Civil Code or an injunction in conjunction with sec. 1004, para l of the 
German Civil Code. 
C. The protection of the right to control one's own image in section 22 of 
the German Act on the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography 
Besides the general tort law provision of section 823 of the German 
Civil Code the right to control one's own image is protected in section 22 of the 
German Act on the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography: 14 
Section 22 (Right to control one's own image) 
lmages and likenesses of a person shall be published on ly with the consent 
of the depicted person. If there is any doubt on consent, if the depicted per-
son got paid for the fact that he wa depicted, the consent is assumed. 
This provision was invented in 1907 after two photographers used the new 
technology to make and to publish snapshots of the body of the death Prince 
12 Palandt B11erger/iches Gesetzb11ch (60'11 ed, Beck, Muenchen, 200 1) nos 182. 
13 Palandt Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (60'" ed, Beck, Muenchen, 200 1) no 183. 
14 Act on the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography, section 22. 
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Otto von Bismarck, the founder of the modem German state. 15 After a big pub-
lic rumour the children of Prince Otto sued the photographers, to destroy the 
photographs and won. 16 On the ground of this experience parliament invented 
section 22 of the Act on the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography with its 
general right to control one's own image. This provision applies generally to all 
persons and situations under the German law. Therefore everyone in Germany 
has the right to decide if images depicting him shall be published. 
Because of the fact, that all German statutes have to be compatible with 
the Gennan Basic Law, the right to control one's own image is a normal statu-
tory definition of the constitutional right to one's personality in context of the 
own image.17 It has to be interpreted consistently with the fundamental rights of 
the German Basic Law. The basis for a claim of a breach of section 22 of the 
Act on the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography is section 823, para l of 
the German Civil Code. 18 In case of the publication of photographs without con-
sent the court can grant damages on the ground of section 823, para l of the 
German Civil Code, and in case of the publication in the future it can grant an 
injunction in conjunction with section 1004, para l of the German Civil Code. 
1. Exemptions to the general right to control one's own image 
Section 23 of the Act on the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography 
contains exemptions to the general right to control one's own image. The most 
important exemption concerns persons that are acting in the public domain: 19 
Section 23 (Exemptions to section 22) 
(I) Without consent may be published: 
I. Images and likenesses of contemporary history; 
15 Thomas Lundmark Princess Caroline in Bismarck's Shadow 
<http://jurist. law.pitt.edu/world/gercor2. htm> (last access O 1. 12. 2003). 
16 Thomas Lundmark Princess Caroline in Bismarck's Shadow 
<http://jurist. law.pitt.edu/world/gercor2. htm> (last access O 1. 12. 2003). 
17 Palandt Buergerliches Cesetzbuch (60'h ed, Beck, Muenchen, 200 I) p 998. The same function 
has sec 12 of the German Civi I Code in terms of the protection of the right on one's own name. 
18 Palandt Buergerliches Cesetzbuch (60tl' ed, Beck, Muenchen, 200 I) p 998. 
19 Act on the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography, section 23. 
6 
2. Images in which persons are only accessory parts beside a landscape or a 
location; 
3. Images or likenesses of assemblies, demonstrations, or similar events in 
which the person participated. 
Section 23, para 1 states a statutory regulation of some aspects of public interest 
and gives regard to the freedom of expression, which is stated in Article 5 (1) of 
the German Basic Law:20 
Article 5 (Freedom of expression) 
( 1) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opin-
ion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from gen-
erally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by 
means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 
In terms of the first exemption of section 23 it means that there is a legitimate 
public interest in the publication of images and likenesses of contemporary his-
tory. This sort of images includes images of persons, which are acting in the 
public domain.2 1 These persons are so-called public figures for all purposes.22 
Public figures for all purposes are for example politicians, famous artists and 
authors or members of the high nobility.23 Generally, celebrities like sport stars 
and television and movie stars fall under this category. They use publicity to 
develop their careers. This emerges an interest of a broad public to the life of 
these persons. Persons that are acting in the public domain must recognise the 
public interest in their person and therefore they have to accept the publication 
of photographs depicting them. The freedom of expression, which includes the 
reporting about these persons, outweighs their tight to their own personality to a 
certain degree. 
20 German Basic Law, Article 6 (I). 
21 BGH [ 1996) 15 NJW, 985. 
22 Thomas Lundmark Princess Caroline in Bismarck's Shadow 
<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/gercor2.htm> (last access: 0 I. J 2 2003). 
23 Thomas Lundmark Princess Caroline in Bismarck's Shadow 
<http://jurist.law.pitt .edu/world/gercor2.htm> (last access: 01. 12. 2003) 
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On the other hand there are so-called public figures for limited pur-
poses.24 These are persons that got into the public domain, because of their par-
ticipation in an extraordinary event, like a natural catastrophe etc, or becauc,e of 
a special behaviour, like a committed crime etc. The public has an interest in 
these persons in so far as it is connected to the event or the behaviour. 
While celebrities are always public figures for all purposes, the classifi-
cation of relatives of celebrities depends on the facts.25 If these persons partici-
pate in the public domain , they are also public figures for all purposes. On cer-
tain occasions they can have the status of a public figure for limited purposes, or 
if they refuse to appear in the public they can have the status of a private per-
26 son. 
D. The case of Princess Caroline of Monaco 
The most recent challenge of the German privacy law system is the case 
of Princess Caroline of Monaco. It started in 1993; when the defendant pub-
lished several photographs depicting the princess in two magazines in France 
and Germany. The articles contained three sorts of photographs: Photographs 
depicting Caroline alone, photographs depicting Caroline with Vincent L., a 
French actor, and photographs depicting Caroline with her children P. and A. 27 
Princess Caroline, who tries to live a private life and who avoids appearing on 
social or public events, sued the publisher for damages and was not successful 
at first instance and her appeal failed too. She argued that the publication of the 
pictures without consent was a breach of section 22 of the German Act on the 
Copyright in Works of Art and Photography and a breach of her general right to 
her personality. In 1995 her appeal to the German Court of Justice was partially 
successful. The court held generally that public persons for all purposes also 
have a right to their own personality.28 This covers the passive right to be left 
alone completely. Also a celebrity has the right to a private sphere and home, 
24 Thomas Lundmark Princess Caroline in Bismarck's Shadow 
<http://juri st. law.pitt.edu/world/gercor2.htrn> (last access: 0 I. 12. 2003). 
25 BVerfG [2000) 30 NJW, 2 190. 
26 BVerfG [2000] 30 NJW, 2190. 
27 BGHZ 13 I, 332, 333. 
28 BGIIZ 131 ,332. 
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which has to be respected by everyone.29 This means that nobody shall publish 
facts and photographs, which were taken at the home or in the marked-of sur-
roundings of this home. In terms of the right to control one's own image the 
court differentiated between the different sorts of photographs and came to the 
result that the publishing of some of these photographs was a breach of her gen-
eral right to her own personality, but the publishing of others was not. 
1. Photographs depicting Caroline alone 
Firstly there were photographs depicting Caroline alone on public places 
like a market place in a small village in France and riding in a forest around that 
village. These images, which show the Princess in the public domain, are im-
ages of the contemporary history because Princess Caroline was classified as a 
public figure for all purposes.30 Therefore the publication of these photographs 
without consent is covered by the first exemption of section 23 of the Act on the 
Copyright in Works of Art and Photography. 
2. Photographs depicting Caroline and Vincent L. 
The second category of photographs depicts Caroline with her then-
partner Vincent L. The two pictures were taken in public restaurants. One de-
picts the couple during a birthday celebration in a group of other persons. The 
other picture depicts the couple in a dark comer of a garden restaurant. The 
court said that there is a difference between these photographs. The first one 
shows Caroline and Vincent on a public place in a public situation. She is sur-
rounded by a number of other persons. Everyone can get access to the restaurant 
and can see her there. It is a public function in a public place. Therefore the ex-
emption of section 23, number l of the German Act on the Copyright in Works 
of Art and Photography applies. 
The second photograph depicts Caroline and her partner Vincent L. 
without other accompaniment. They are sitting in a dark comer of a restaurant 
and try to avoid other persons' company. The Federal Court of Justice held that 
this situation differs significantly from the situation described above, because 
29 BGHZ 131 ,332. 
30 BGHZ 131 ,332. 
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there can be also a private sphere even at places with public access. 31 If a person 
shows clearly that she or he wants to be left alone, this person might have this 
right even in public places. This rule applies also to public figures for all pur-
poses.32 Certainly it is not enough that the person wants to be left alone. She has 
to choose a public place in which she is actually separated from the general pub-
lic. The wish to be separated from the general public has to be obvious for other 
persons. Moreover the person has to behave in a way, which shows this wish. 
The person must separate itself from a broad public in a way that she or he does 
not appear as a part of the public any Ionger.33 
The wish of the person to be left alone has to be balanced against the 
interest of the public in the publication of the photographs and the knowledge 
about the depicted footage. 34 The value of information of the depicted incident 
is the most significant criteria in this balancing. The bigger the information 
value for the public is, the less important is the need for protection of a public 
figure for all purposes. On the other hand weighs the interest for protection of a 
public figure for all purposes higher, if there is just a small value of information 
for the public in the depicted incident. 
In the case of the picture depicting Caroline and Vincent L. in a dark 
comer of a garden restaurant the Federal Court of Justice decided that these re-
quirements were fulfilled . Caroline and Vincent L. were separated almost from 
any public in this place and behaved obviously in a way expressing that they 
wanted to be left alone. They tried to separate from a broad public and the pho-
tographs were taken out off a long distance. Moreover the Federal Court of Jus-
tice said that the value of information of the depicted incident was relatively 
small.35 The interest of the public in this photograph is curiosity, sensation 
mongering and mere entertainment. The right of Princess Caroline to her own 
personality outweighs the public interest in the publication of the photograph 
and therefore the right to freedom of expression of the publishers. So the court 
stated that in such a situation the right to one's own personality of a public fig-
3 1 BGHZ 131, 339. 
32 BGHZ 131,339. 
33 BGHZ 131, 340. 
34 BGHZ 131, 342. 
35 BGHZ 131,342. 
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ure for all purposes is protected, even though she or he appears on a public 
place. 
3. Photographs depicting Caroline with her children P. and A. 
In this context the photographs depicting Caroline with her children are 
most interesting. The photographs show Caroline and her children on a walk 
and kayaking on a river. Both Caroline and her children were clearly identifi-
able. The German Court of Justice held that these activities were in the public 
domain. Moreover, it affirmed the opinion of the lower courts that the children 
of celebrities, in this case a member of the high nobility, are public figures for 
all purposes too. 36 The court thought that the public interest in the descendants 
of celebrities, and of members of the high nobility in particular, is a strong one 
and needs to be protected. Therefore the court held that the publication of these 
photographs without consent was covered be section 23 of the German Act on 
the Copyright in Works of Art and Photography and not an illegal intrusion of 
the privacy of princess Caroline and her children. 
4. The rehearing of the case by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
On an appeal of the Princess the German Federal Constitutional Court 
reheard the case.37 It upheld the opinion of the German Federal Court of Justice 
that Caroline of Monaco is a public figure for all purposes and that the photo-
graphs have been taken in the public domain. 38 It also upheld the decision of the 
Federal Court of Justice that the right to one's own personality can apply on 
celebrities, although they are acting in a public place. Therefore, it agreed with 
the decision concerning the other pictures. However, it disagreed with the clas-
sification of the children as public figures for all purposes. The Federal Consti-
tutional Court did not say expressly why the children are not public figures for 
all purposes, but it held that children deserve more protection than other per-
sons. This opinion depends on Article 6 of the German Basic Law:39 
36 Thomas Lundmark Princess Caroline in Bismarck 's Shadow 
<http://jurist.la w .pitt.edu/world/gercor2.htm> (last access O I. 12. 2003). 
37 BYerfG [2000] 14 NJW, 1021. 
38 BYerfG [2000) 14 NJW, 1021. 
39 German Basic Law, Article 6 (I), (2). 
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Article 6 (Marriage and the family; children born outside of marriage) 
( l) Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state. 
(2) The care and upbringing of children is the natural right of parents and a 
duty primarily incumbent upon them. The slate shall watch over them in the 
performance of this duty. 
According to the court the educational rights of the parents and the obligation to 
protect the children must be taken into account, in context of Article 5 (2) of the 
German Basic Law:40 
These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in pro-
visions for the protection of youn g persons, and in the right to personal 
honour. 
Therefore, it is a question of balancing of Article 2 (1), Article 1 (1) and Article 
6 on the one side and Article 5 (1 ) on the other side.41 The safety of the child 
and the importance of the parent - child relationship outweighs freedom of ex-
pression. Therefore, "children of public figures should not lose their privacy 
unless they are deliberately thrust into the public eye."42 With this statement the 
German Federal Constitutional Court abolished the exemption of section 23 of 
the Act on the Copyright in Works of Arts and Photographs in the context of the 
publication of a photograph of children. If a child is thrust into the public eye, 
parental consent can be assumed and if the media will report about the child it is 
covered by section 22 of the same act anyway. After this decision it is nearly 
impossible to publish a photograph of a child without the consent of the parents. 
III. THE LAW OF PRIVACY IN NEW ZEALAND 
In New Zealand law there are several torts dealing with the right of pri -
vacy . Causes of action such as trespass, nuisance, breach of confidence, harass-
ment, and intentional infliction of emotional harm have existed for a long time 
40 German Basic Law, Article 5 (2) . 
41 BverfG NJW [20001 14, 1021. 
42 Thomas Lundmark Princess Caroline in Bismarck 's Shadow 
<hltp://jurist.law.pitt.edu/worlcVgercor2.htm> (Last access O I. 12. 2003). 
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and protect certain aspects of privacy .43 Besides these "classical" torts, a tort of 
invasion of privacy was recognised recently in several cases.44 In P v D Nichol-
son J established a four-step test for the invasion of privacy by disclosure of 
private facts: 45 
(i) That the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure and 
not a private one. 
(ii) Facts disclosed to the public must be private facts and not public ones. 
(iii) The matter made public must be one, which would be highly offensive 
and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
(iv) The nature and extend of legitimate public interest in having the infor-
mation disclosed. 
Until Randerson J' s j udgmen t in the Hos king case it seemed that a tort of 
invasion of privacy by disclosure of private facts was widely accepted in New 
Zealand:46 
I support the introduction into the New Zealand common law of a tort cov-
ering invasion of privacy at least by public disclosure of private facts. 
The existence of the named tort was also supported by the case of Bradley v 
Wing nut Films Ltd. 47 In the latter Gallen J denied the application of the tort of 
invasion of privacy, because the disclosed facts were neither private nor highly 
offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person.48 Nevertheless, the mere con-
sideration of the application of this tort shows its existence. 
This existence of a tort of invasion of privacy by disclosure of private 
facts seems to be not that clear, since Randerson J held in Hosking v Runting:49 
43 John Burrows/ Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (411, ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999) 173. 
44 
Tucker v News Media Ownership [ 1986) 2 NZLR 716; Bradley v Wingnlll Films Ltd [ 1993) I 
NZLR 415. 
45 [2000] NZLR p601. 
46 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [ 1986] 2 NZLR 716, 733 
41 Bradley v. Wingnut Films Ltd [1993) I NZLR 415. 
48 Bradley v. Wingnut Films Ltd (1993) I NZLR 415,425. 
49 
Hosking v Runting (2003] lligh Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 184). 
I have concluded that the court should not recognise such a tort for these 
broad reasons: 
[a] The deliberate approach to privacy taken by the legislature to date 
on privacy issues suggests that the courts should be cautious about cre-
ating new law in this field; 
[b] The tort contended for by the plaintiffs goes well beyond the limited 
form of the tort recognised in decisions of this court to date and is not 
supported by principle or authority; 
[c] Existing remedies are likely to be sufficient to meet most claims to 
privacy based on the public disclosure of private information and to 
protect children whose privacy may be infringed without such disclo-
sure; 
[d] In the light of subsequent developments, it is difficult to support the 
privacy cases decided in New Zealand to date ; 
[e] To the extend there may be gaps in privacy law, they should be 
filled by legislature, not the courts 
This statement sounds quite ambiguous in context of the existence of a tort of 
invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts. On the one hand Rand-
erson J names the recognised tort in other cases and denies the application in the 
Hosking case because this tort does not extend as broadly as the plaintiffs sug-
gested. On the other hand the judge does not want to support the existence of 
this tort at all and thinks that the existing remedies provide sufficient protection 
of privacy in New Zealand. So the statement seems to be rather a denial of the 
existence of the named tort. Another finding of Randerson J supports this opin-
ion :50 
In the light of subsequent development elsew here and for the reasons elabo-
rated in this judgement, I would respectfully differ from the conclusions 
reached in those earlier decisions . Any development of the law of privacy 
by the courts should build incrementally on existing remedies, particularly 
the equitable action for breach of confidence. 
50 Hosking v Runting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527 /02 Randerson J [ l I 8]. 
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This rather mysterious judgement demands a closer view on the Hosking case 
and the reasoning of Randerson J. 
An in-depth examination of the judgement of Randerson J in the Hosk-
ing case raises two important questions, which are still unanswered. Firstly: Is 
there a need for a tort of privacy and does it fit in the New Zealand legal sys-
tem? Secondly: Does the legal situation provide a sufficient protection of the 
privacy of children? Unlike the German legal system, the legal system of New 
Zealand does not provide such a clear and strong framework for the protection 
of privacy. The protection of privacy in Germany is based on the constitution-
ally guaranteed right to one's personality, which covers the privacy of a person 
in a very broad sense. This right to one's personality has to be balanced with 
another constitutionally guaranteed right, the freedom of expression. The Ger-
man Civil Code provides causes of action for a breach of privacy and courts are 
enabled on these grounds to grant damages and injunctions. The Act on the 
Copyright in works of Art and Photography establishes expressly the right of 
everyone to control one's own image. Exemptions are only made with public 
figures for all purposes and public figures for limited purposes. In cases dealing 
with the privacy of children the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the 
family and the rights of the parents to bring up their children have to be taken 
into account. This legal framework provides a strong protection of the right to 
privacy and the right to privacy weighs quite heavy in a balancing with the free-
dom of expression. 
A. Is there a need for a tort of privacy in New Zealand 
Although the New Zealand legal system does not provide such a strong 
framework for the protection of privacy, the assumption that a tort of privacy 
does not fit in the New Zealand legal system seems not to be as clear as Rander-
son J supposes. It has to be examined if there is a need for the named tort and to 
which extend it should be developed. 
As Randerson J concedes it is not a question if there are rights to privacy 
in principle:5 1 
Undoubtedly, certain rights to privacy do exist. So much is clear from the 
statutory provisions and common law rights, which currently give effect to 
discrete aspects of privacy. 
This general principle finds support in the English jurisdiction in the judgement 
of Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd:52 
Nevertheless, we have reached a point at which it can be said with confi-
dence that the law recognises and will appropriately protect a right of per-
sonal privacy. 
Although Richardson J held in R v Jefferies that there is no general guarantee of 
privacy in the BORA, he acknowledges that there may be rights to privacy in 
certain circumstances:53 
The nature and significance of a privacy value depends on the circum-
stances in which it arises. Thus privacy values relied on in search and sei-
zure cases under the Fourth Amendment range from security, to secrecy, to 
the broad right to be let alone. 
He does not deny the existence of privacy rights at all, but he says that the con-
tent and the extent of the right to privacy depends on the circumstances and has 
to be interpreted quite carefully. Therefore, the main question is not if there is a 
right to privacy, but which interests this right to privacy covers and in which 
way and to which extent these interests should be protected. The need for a right 
to privacy appears quite clear in context of recent developments in our society: 54 
In modem society several developments have made us more conscious of 
the value of having a sphere in which we can keep ourselves to ourselves. 
The first is the increasing sophistication of modem technology. [ ... ] Sec-
51 Hosking v Runting [20031 High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 117) . 
52 Douglas v Hello' Ltd [200 l] QB 967 (CA) Sedley LJ [ 110] . 
53 R v Jefferies [ 1994] l NZLR (CA) Richardson J 290,302. 
54 John Burrows "Invasion of Privacy" In Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand 
(3'ct ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 908. 
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ondly, certain sections of the media are becoming increasingly involved in 
investigative reporting and are sometimes tempted to publicise facts about 
people, causing humiliation and distress;[ ... ] Thirdly as cities become more 
populous, and as we are thrust daily closer to people, we come to appreciate 
more the ability to control access to the things about us, which we regard as 
nobody's business but our own. 
1. A definition of the term 'privacy' 
To answer the question in which way privacy should be protected and to what 
extent one has to know what privacy means. According to the statement of 
Richardson J it seems to be quite difficult to define the term 'privacy', because 
it appears in various situations and its meaning depends on the given circum-
stances. This difficulty might be one reason, why the courts were so reluctant in 
the development of the law of privacy:55 
The various definitions of privacy in the literature, of which the right to be 
left alone is only one, are useful to the extent that they reveal the many lay-
ers of ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding this idea. 
However, is it a sufficient reason not to protect a right, because there are diffi-
culties to find an ultimate definition? 
Under the German jurisdiction the right to one's personality is under-
stood in a very broad sense. It protects as well a passive right to privacy against 
the interference of the private sphere by other persons as an active right to con-
trol the appearance of the own personality in relation to other persons.56 
Nevertheless, the Gennan idea of a right to control one's personality does not 
provide an ultimate definition either. It is more a general right, which can apply 
to various cases and situations. Therefore, it is more a blanket clause, which has 
to be interpreted by the courts in a case-by-case decision. Over the years in 
which the right to one's personality is accepted in the German law, the courts 
have developed many categories of cases, which fulfil the requirements of an 
action for a breach of this right, but there are still new cases decided on the 
grounds of the right to one's personality, which have not occurred so far. 
Nevertheless German courts are dealing with the concept of a constitutionally 
55 Geoffrey Palmer Privacy and the Law ( 1975) NZU 747, 748. 
56 Seep 4. 
17 
courts are dealing with the concept of a constitutionally guaranteed right to 
one's personality for almost fifty years, in which they developed an extensive 
protection of privacy. 
Although there are difficulties in defining the term 'privacy' one aspect 
seems to be accepted quite broadly. Privacy includes "the right to be left 
alone."57 However, the Australian Law Reform Commission proposed a more 
accurate definition in 1983:58 
Privacy claims involve a number of aspects: 
that the person of the individual should be respected, ie it should not be 
interfered with without consent; 
that the individual should be able to exercise a measure of control over 
relationships with others; this means that: 
a person should be able to exert an appropriate measure of 
control on the extent to which hi s correspondence, communi-
cations, and activities are available to others in the commu-
nity; and 
he should be able to control the extent to which information 
about him is available to others in the community. 
Although this definition does not cover all possible occasions on which the right 
to privacy could apply, it names three of the most important issues in context of 
privacy. Firstly it establishes a personal sphere, which has to be respected by 
everyone. It includes the right of the person to exclude everyone from this 
sphere she or he wants to. In a local sense it means, that everybody has the right 
to a private place that must not be breached by another one. This understanding 
of privacy is comparable to the German passive right to one's personality. Sec-
ondly it recognises the right of every person to control her or his appearance in 
relation to others to a certain extend. This right covers some of the areas, which 
are guaranteed by the active right to one's personality in the German law, even 
though it does not extend as far as the German rights. Lastly the definition 
names the right of everybody to decide who should receive information about 
57 SO Warren and LD Brandeis The Right to Privacy ( 1890) 4 Harv L Rev 194. 
58 Australian Law Reform Commission Privacy, report no 22, 1983, [ 1033- 1034]. 
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her or him and which information this should be. This could be called a right to 
self-determination about the publication of information. Interestingly the New 
Zealand Parliament has recognised this right by the adoption of the Privacy Act 
1993. 
The New Zealand Law Commission recently published another cata-
logue of rights, which are covered by the law of privacy: 59 
freedom from surveillance, whether by law enforcement or national se-
curity agents, stalkers, paparazzi or voyeurs; 
freedom from physical intrusion into one's body, through various types 
of drugs testing procedures, or into one's immediate surrounding; 
control of one's identity; and 
protection of personal information. 
While point three and four are quite similar to the second and third aspect of the 
definition introduced above, this approach adds a new aspect in the first point. 
Freedom from surveillance is undoubtedly covered by the right to be left alone, 
but this version includes expressly the actions of paparazzi, which is very im-
portant in the context of media in general and the Hosking case in particular. 
Although this approach does not provide complete definition of the term privacy 
too, all the approaches show that there is a right to privacy at all. Maybe it is 
difficult or even impossible to define this right, but without doubt also the New 
Zealand legal system recognises the individual interest in privacy. Moreover, 
these rights to privacy have to be protected:60 
Not one of these difficulties is unique to privacy, nor a conclusive reason 
for refusing to recognise it as a legal interest worthy of protection. 
59 New Zealand Law Commission Protecting Personal Infor111ation fro111 Disclosure [2002] 
Preliminary Paper 49, p I. 
60 John Burrows "Invasion of Privacy" In Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand 
(3'd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 200 I) 910. 
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Therefore, the main question is, in which way these privacy interests are 
protected sufficiently? In the Hosking case Randerson J argued that this protec-
tion should be guaranteed by a careful development of the existing rem~dies. 
This statement has to be examined. 
2. The facts of the Hosking case 
On a busy Saturday morning the plaintiff Mrs Hosking pushed a stroller 
with her twin daughters along a footpath in Newmarket when she was photo-
graphed by the first defendant Mr Runting. He was commissioned by the New 
Idea magazine, published by the second defendant Pacific Magazines NZ Ltd .. 
Mrs Hosking did not know that the photographs were taken until New Idea told 
her about their intention to publish the photographs. Mrs Hosking opposed the 
publication strongly arguing that the publication could be a serious risk for the 
safety of the children. This concern based on the fact that her husband Mr Hosk-
ing works on TV. New Idea agreed not to publish the photographs until the end 
of the trial. In the previous year an article about the Hoskings was published in 
which they disclosed the fact that the twins were procreated in by of in-vitro-
fertilization. This article was accompanied by photographs of Mr and Mrs 
Hosking. Moreover, the Hoskings consented to the publication of in utero pho-
tographs of the twins later this year. Leave to intervene was granted to ACP 
Media Ltd and the Commonwealth Press Union. 
B. A critique of the reasoning of Randerson J 
Besides his doubts in supporting a tort of invasion of privacy by public 
disclosure of private facts, Randerson J accepts the existence of rights to privacy 
in principle. He is interested in another point: 61 
But the real question in this case is whether the court should recognise a 
privacy tort, which would provide a remedy for the public disclosure of 
photographs of the plaintiffs' children taken while they were in a public 
place. 
He denies the need for such a tort for the broad reasons cited above. Interest-
ingly the judge does not only negate his own question, moreover he doubts the 
61 Hosking v Ru11ting [20031 High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 117). 
20 
existence of a tort of privacy at all. Even though this statement is not a neces-
sary reason in the logic of the findings of his judgement, he articulates this opin-
ion more as an obiter dictum. 
So, what are the reasons leading Randerson J to his conclusion? In this 
context one has to distinguish between the general considerations concerning 
the right to privacy and the considerations based on the facts of this particular 
case. In a general context Randerson J reasons his critique of the existence of a 
tort of invasion of privacy on the fact that parliament did not adopt such a tort, 
an analysis of the existing remedies and a critique of the previous decisions of 
the High Court. 
1. The critique of the previous decisions of the High Court 
Randerson J' s findings are based on a critique of the previous decisions 
of the High Court dealing with privacy matters. The main critique on these deci-
sions is founded on the fact that the legal circumstances had changed remarka-
bly after these decisions. So Tucker was decided before the enactment of the 
BORA with its expressly protection of freedom of expression in section 14. The 
already mentioned cases have been decided without knowledge about the new 
developments in the law of breach of confidence in the UK. In the opinion of 
Randerson J the recent English cases show that a pre-existing relationship is no 
longer necessary for an action for breach of confidence.62 Therefore, "a duty to 
respect confidence may be imposed having regard to the nature of the material 
which comes into the potential defendant's possession."63 Moreover, the devel-
opment of a tort of invasion of privacy could not logically ground on the cause 
of action for intentional infliction of distress, because the intention of the media 
in particular is not the infliction of distress, but rather the circulation of infonna-
tion. 
In his general analysis of a tort of invasion of privacy by public disclo-
sure of private facts Randerson J concludes:64 
62 Hosking v Rwzting (2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J ( 177]. 
63 Hosking v Runting (2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J ( 177). 
64 Hosking v Runting (2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 178]. 
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On the basis of the material before me and for the reasons given, I would 
respectfully differ from the previous decisions of this court supporting a tort 
of privacy. 
Instead he states that the existing remedies provide enough protection of pri-
vacy . If there is a need to do something, he favours the development of the ac-
tion for breach of confidence as experienced in several English cases. Lastly a 
gap in privacy law should be filled by legislative action of parliament and not 
by activities of the courts. 
This statement seems to be quite surprising. As aforementioned the 
whole system of privacy protection in the German law is based on statutes. This 
is due to the fact that all areas of German law are governed by statutes. The 
German legal system does not know a common law system. Therefore, all legal 
provisions have to be made by parliament. In contrast to the codified German 
law system, the New Zealand legal system is a common law system. This sys-
tem is characterised by the ability of the courts to develop the common law, if it 
is necessary . Therefore, the reasoning of Randerson J would make sense in a 
completely codified legal system, such as the German one, but not in the New 
Zealand common law system. 
2. The analysis of the existing remedies 
The next issue that Randerson J concerned in his judgement is an analy-
sis of the already existing remedies. As aforementioned there are several torts in 
the New Zealand legal system dealing with the protection of privacy. In his 
analysis the judge focuses on the existing action for breach of confidence. Fol-
l . 11 · . ~ owmg t 1s reasonmg: 
Judicial method ordinarily prefers the development of the common law to 
proceed by building on ex isting causes of action where that can be achieved 
in a principled way and without compromising other established legal pat-
terns. I see no reason why our courts should not develop the action for 
breach of confidence to protect personal privacy through the public di sclo-
sure of private information where it is warranted. 
65 Hosking v Runting (2003] lligh Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 158]. 
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Such a development of the action for breach of confidence could be understood 
as a justified limitation under section 5 BORA to the right to freedom of expres-
sion of section 14 BORA. Moreover, the application of the action for breach of 
confidence in cases dealing with the public disclosure of private facts could 
avoid problems with the doctrine of prior restraint, which was established in 
context of defamation law. Randerson J argued that an action for the invasion of 
privacy would enable a plaintiff to seek for an interim injunction, where she or 
he were not able to seek this injunction in an action for defamation. This prob-
lem would not occur in an action for breach of confidence because these actions 
would not overlap with defamation action. Otherwise it would be possible to 
argue a case of defamation on the grounds of the new privacy tort. Moreover, 
the development of the action for breach of confidence would have the advan-
tage that there is already an established public interest defence. In the opinion of 
Randerson J these reasons promote the development of the existing action for 
breach of confidence instead of the creation of a tort of invasion of privacy. 
3. Invasion of privacy v existing remedies 
Randerson J proposes that privacy protection should be developed upon 
the grounds of remedies already existing in the legal system of New Zealand. 
He refers particularly to the recent development of the action for breach of con-
fidence in England. However, there are several causes of action dealing with the 
protection of privacy in New Zealand. 
(a) Existing remedies 
There are many causes of action in New Zeeland law that protect certain 
aspects of privacy, such as Trespass, Nuisance, Harassment and Defamation. 
Trespass and Nuisance deal with privacy aspects connected to the property in-
terests of the landlord, Nuisance with privacy interests connected to the dignity 
of a person and defamation with privacy interests connected to the reputation of 
a person. All these aspects can be part of the privacy of a person, but these 
causes of action are designed to protect other interests. The protection of pri-
vacy interests is only a by-product. They do not provide a unique protection of 
privacy itself and cannot be developed in this way without losing their original 
shape. Therefore these remedies do not provide sufficient protection of privacy. 
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(b) Breach of confidence 
Another tort dealing with the disclosure of private information is the 
cause of action for breach of confidence. In his analysis Randerson J focused on 
this tort and its recent development under the English jurisdiction. Indeed Keene 
LJ held in Douglas v Hello! Ltd:66 
Whether the resulting liability is described as being for breach of confi-
dence or for breach of s right to privacy may be little more than deciding 
what label is to be attached to the cause of action, but there would be 
seem to be merit in recognising that the original concept of breach of con-
fidence has in this particular category of cases now developed into some-
thing different from the commercial and employment relationships with 
which confidentiality is mainly concerned. 
In this case the English Court of Appeal recognised the existence of a right to 
privacy after the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). By recogni-
tion of several rights set out in the European Convention for Protection of Hu-
man Rights and fundamental Freedoms, Article 8 came into force in the English 
law, adopted by section 1 HRA: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
On this ground the English courts had to accept the need for protection of these 
rights. However, the Court of Appeal preferred to develop the existing tort of 
breach of confidence, than to establish a new tort of invasion of privacy. There-
fore, the judges abolished the established requirement of an existing relationship 
between the involved persons: 67 
66 Douglas v Hello' Ltd [200 l l QB 967 (CA) Keene LJ [ 167]. 
67 Douglas v Hello' Ltd [200 l J QB 967 (CA) Keene LJ [ 167]. 
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Already before the coming into force of the Act there have been persua-
sive dicta in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Devonshire [ 1995) I WLR 
804, 807 and Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) 
[ 1990) I AC 109, 281 cited by Sedley 1J in his judgement in these pro-
ceedings, to the effect that a pre-existing confidential relationship be-
tween the is not required for a breach of confidence suit. The nature of the 
subject matter or the circumstances of the defendant's activities may suf-
fice in some instances to give rise to liability for breach of confidence. 
Saying that the tort of breach of confidence gets a much wider scope as known 
so far, since such a relationship is one of the widely accepted requirements of 
breach of confidence in New Zealand:68 
To date, the action for breach of confidence has been limited to situations 
involving a relationship of confidence including third party receivers with 
notice of the breach of confidence arising from a relationship. 
Moreover the existing remedies including breach of confidence have been re-
garded as not extensive enough to cover all aspects of a right to privacy:69 
Certain common law actions do protect privacy interests. These include 
the actions for trespass, nuisance, breach of confidence, copyright, mali-
cious falsehood, intentional in!1iction of nervous shock, negligence, and 
breach of contract. But these actions do not provide a remedy for every 
invasion of privacy. 
Therefore, a new tort of privacy by public disclosure of private facts was re-
garded as necessary to provide sufficient protection of privacy interests. As 
shown above the protection of p1ivacy by other remedies is a by-product of the 
protection of other rights, for example property or reputation . This is quite simi-
lar to the tort of breach of confidence. The interest, which is protected by this 
tort, is confidence. Perhaps this may overlap in several cases with privacy inter-
ests, but privacy and confidence are not the same at all. The right to privacy 
protects a private sphere nobody should interfere with without consent of the 
68 Katrine Evans Reverse Gear for NZ's privacy tort: the Hosking decision (2003) PLPR 61, 62. 
69 Rosemary Tobin Invasion of Privacy (2000) NZU, 216. 
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concerned person. Therefore it is broadly described as the right to be left alone. 
If the concerned person wants to be left alone, there hardly can emerge confi-
dence, since confidence requires two or more persons:70 
Confidence: 1 the belief that one can have faith in or rely on someone or 
something. 2 the telling of private matters or secrets with mutual trust. 
Confidence requires a relation of two or more persons. It is hardly to understand 
that this relation does not have to be a pre-existing relation of confidence as the 
judges at the English Court of Appeal suggest. Anyway, assuming confidence 
two or more persons have to be involved. Privacy means exactly that there is 
just one person involved, the person, which is concemed:71 
Privacy: a stale in which one is not observed or disturbed by others. 
In a private situation a person tries to avoid the unwanted existence of relation-
ships to others. There should not emerge a relation to other in the private sphere 
without the consent of the person concerned. While breach of confidence pro-
tects the trust in another person, the right to privacy protects the person from the 
interference of others. While breach of confidence requires a relationship of two 
or more persons, the right to privacy should prevent the emergence of relation-
ships without the consent of the person concerned. In the case of public disclo-
sure of private facts a cause of action for breach of privacy should prevent the 
emergence of a relationship between the person concerned and several other 
persons, which learned about these facts because of the disclosure. This rela-
tionship would be based on the knowledge about the disclosed facts. A cause of 
action for breach of confidence should prevent that a person publishes facts that 
she or he learned confidentially about another person. Therefore, it already ex-
ists a relationship between this person and the person concerned, maybe estab-
lished by chance. The tort of breach of confidence shall avoid the abuse of this 
relationship. Therefore, the purpose of protection of the tort of breach of confi-
dence and a tort of privacy are completely different.72 Perhaps the effect of an 
action for a breach of confidence is the protection of privacy interests, but only 
7° Concise Oxford Dictionary 
7 1 Concise Oxford Dictionary 
72 Rosemary Tobin Privacy: One step forward, two steps back! (2003) NZL.J 256, 258. 
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by chance. Since a tort of breach of confidence and a tort of privacy have differ-
ent purposes of protection a tort of breach of confidence would hardly cover all 
situations of inflictions of privacy interests:73 
After all it is well established that where a matter is in the public domain, 
it cannot be said to be confidential. 
Thus the development of the tort of breach of confidence would have its borders 
always in the term 'confidence'. Since confidence and privacy are not identical 
a tort based on confidence would not provide a scope of protection, which cor-
responds to the wide range of privacy interests. 
If the tort of breach of confidence shall cover all privacy interests sepa-
rated from the concept of confidence, this procedure would interfere with the 
judicial method explained by Randerson J. This method develops the common 
law "by building on existing causes of action where that can be achieved in a 
principled way and without compromising other established legal pattems."74 
The judge suggests that the tort of breach of confidence can be developed in a 
way, which covers most privacy interests. As aforementioned the concepts of 
confidentiality and privacy are quite different and only overlap in some cases. 
Therefore, the development of the tort of breach of confidence in the boundaries 
of the concept of confidentiality would not provide sufficient protection of pri-
vacy. An extension of the tort of breach of confidence to all privacy interests 
would abolish the concept of confidentiality and therefore compromise other 
established legal patterns. 
Thus the existing remedies including breach of confidence do not pro-
vide a sufficient protection of the wide range of privacy interests. Many of them 
protect certain privacy interests as a by-product of the protection of the interest 
they were designed to originally. None of them can be developed in a way, 
which would cover all privacy interests and even not all of them together pro-
vide a sufficient remedy for a breach of privacy in particular. Therefore, there is 
a need of a tort of privacy in New Zealand. Such a tort at least by the disclosure 
73 Katrine Evans Reverse Gear for NZ's privacy tort: the Hosking decision (2003) PLPR 61, 62. 
74 Seep 17. 
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of private facts fits in quite well in the legal system of New Zealand. Although 
the right to privacy is enshrined in the BORA, it cannot be denied that the law in 
New Zealand recognises several interests of privacy. These privacy interests 
have to be protected in an adequate way. The tort of invasion of privacy by dis-
closure of private facts as introduced above provides this level of protection. 
Certainly the privacy interests have always to be balanced against freedom of 
expression named in section 14 BORA. Now, the fact that this freedom is ex-
pressly established in the BORA does not mean that it inevitably outweighs the 
privacy interests of the other party. This has to be decided case-by-case. Step 
four of the privacy tort dealing with public interest provides a good basis for 
this balancing. 
4. The scope of the tort of invasion of privacy 
Another interesting question is how wide the scope of this tort should be. 
This question is connected to the problem what is meant by the expression 'pri-
vate facts'. Undoubtedly domestic matters such as behaviour in the private 
sphere or personal or family circumstances have to be regarded as private.
75 
This kind of private sphere builds the core of all privacy interests: A domestic 
sphere that everyone has to respect and nobody has to interfere with without the 
consent of the person concerned. This includes occurrences in private places 
and sensitive private information. More difficult to answer is the question how 
far this private sphere can reach into the public domain . As the German example 
shows, also the appearance in public places can be characterised as private in 
certain circumstances. If the person obviously tries to separate from the broad 
public, this can fulfil the requirement of privacy. In this question the publication 
of photographs taken in a public place is interesting. One can argue that these 
photographs never could be regarded as private facts, because they were dis-
closed to the public anyway. Randerson J said in this context:
76 
There is no statutory prohibition against the taking of photographs in a 
public street and, in general, it must be taken to be one of the ordinary in-
cidents of living in a free community. 
75 John Burrows/ Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4~' ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999) p 175 . 
76 Hosking v Runting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 138] . 
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This statement is completely right, but it does not address the point of the case. 
Not the taking of the photographs is the problem, but the intended publication. 
Now, the publication of photographs without consent of the depicted person is 
not inevitably an ordinary incident of living in a free community. This shows 
the German example. The German legal system recognises a right to control 
one ' s own image and provides a strong protection of privacy interests. How-
ever, German society is still recognised as a free community . The German ex-
perience shows that this protection does not inevitably lead to an unacceptable 
restriction of freedom of expression. A well-developed system of protection has 
to provide enough exemptions, which give sufficient regard to the public inter-
est and the impact of freedom of expression. The German system acknowledges 
the public interest in the life of celebrities and established the exemptions for 
public figures for all purposes and public figures for limited purposes. More-
over, photographs depicting persons just as background may be published with-
out consent. This system establishes a good balance of privacy interests on the 
one hand and public interest and freedom of expression on the other hand. 
Recently, it has been decided that also the publication of a video film 
taken in a public place breached the plaintiff's right to privacy .
77 Although this 
case depends on its extraordinary facts , it shows that photographs taken in the 
public arena could be regarded as private facts . In the Hosking case one could 
argue that the private information was made public, but only to the number of 
persons, which were around at this Saturday in Newmarket. This is different to a 
publication of the photographs in a newspaper and therefore to the whole world. 
Moreover, this publication establishes a permanent record of the photographs, 
which the children have to live their whole life with . They have no other choice 
than to accept the subsequent development. Nevertheless, the prohibition of the 
publication of the photographs would lead to a kind of a right to control one' s 
image as recognised in the German law of privacy . This right was not known in 
the law of privacy in New Zealand so far. It will be interesting to see in which 
way and to what extend the tort of privacy will be developed in this context. 
77 Peck v Th e United Kingdom, Application no. 44647/98 ECHR 28 January 2003. Jn this case 
Mr Peck was filmed in a public place possessing a knife. He was in a depressive state and had 
attempted suicide ri ght before the video was filmed. 
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5. The analysis of the legislative context 
In the legislative context Randerson J pointed out:78 
In developing remedies to meet perceived needs in 'hard' cases, courts 
should be careful not to go beyond their proper constitutional rule. 
Criteria to decide how far a court should go in establishing new remedies are 
"the statutory context; the availability of existing remedies; the extend to which 
the new development might impact on established patterns of law; policy con-
siderations; and prevailing community values and goals."79 The statutory con-
text is determined by two main statutory complexes. On the one hand there is 
the way in which the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) deals with 
matters of privacy and freedom of expression. Obviously the BORA does not 
mention a right to privacy, while it establishes expressly the freedom of expres-
sion in section 14. Randerson J admits "that the section 21 right to be secure 
against unreasonable search and seizure affords protection against invasion of 
privacy in relation to person or property, but that is a specific and narrower right 
than that contended for by the plaintiffs."80 This opinion is supported by a 
judgment of the Court of Appeal: 81
 
... neither the Bill of Rights nor the International Covenant gives a general 
guarantee of privacy. And New Zealand does not have a general privacy 
law.[ ... ] It is not surprising that there is no single readily identifiable value 
applying in all cases. 
Randerson J assumed that the expressly named freedom of expression weighs 
much bigger than the right to privacy, because the BORA does not provide pro-
tection of a right to privacy, 
The other important area in the statutory context is the recent legislation 
of parliament dealing with privacy issues. The most important legislative ac-
tions in this context are the Privacy Act 1993 and the Broadcasting Standards 
78 Hoski11g v Runting [2003] l-ligh Court Auckland CP 527 /02 Randerson J [ 119]. 
79 Hosking v Runting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J (119] . 
80 Hoski11g v Ru11ti11g [2003 J l-ligh Court Auckland CP 527 /02 Randerson J [ 123]. 
81 R v Jeffries [ 1994] l NZLR (CA) Richardson J 290,302. 
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Act 1989. In context of the Privacy Act Randerson J concludes, "It does not 
create tortious rights and duties."82 Moreover, the Act does not establish any 
general right to privacy, which the plaintiff could rely on. The analysis of the 
Broadcasting Standards Act focuses on another point. Randerson J admits that 
the principles developed by the Broadcasting Standards Authority on the 
grounds of the Broadcasting Standards Act include the protection against the 
public disclosure of private facts where the facts disclosed are highly offensive 
and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. This principle 
is quite similar to the test developed by Nicholson Jin P v D,83 but Randerson J 
emphasises the fact that the Broadcasting Standards Act applies only to the 
broadcasting media and not to the defendants in the Hosking case. While the 
judge says that neither the Privacy Act nor the Broadcasting Standards Act pre-
cludes expressly the development of a common law cause of action on the field 
of privacy law, his conclusion points out another opinion: 84 
What the Privacy Act and the Broadcasting Act do demon trate is that Par-
liament has acted deliberately and carefully to establish privacy protections 
in these areas and the courts should treat carefully when considering the de-
velopment of common law rights in related areas. 
6. Should this tort be developed by the courts 
Does the recent legislative activity of parliament really preclude the de-
velopment of a tort of invasion of privacy by the courts? The reasoning of 
Randerson J followed the line that parliament recently enacted several statutes 
dealing with privacy issues, but none of them contained remedies for a breach 
of privacy.85 Therefore, courts should be very cautious concerning the develop-
ment of new causes of action in this area. In the rehearing of the Hosking case at 
the court of appeal the appellants argued: 86 
The most important principle of the common law is a principle of change, 
and the conunon law tradition teaches that the life of the law is response 
to the human needs. 
82 Hosking v Rwzting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 128]. 
83 Seep 12. 
84 1/osking v Ru11ti11g [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 134]. 
85 Seep 17. 
86 Hosking v Runting Court of Appeal 101/03 Appellants submissions, p38. 
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Indeed one of the main advantages of a common law system is a higher degree 
of flexibility to deal with new developments in society. In contrast to a codified 
law system judges, experts in law, shall be able to develop the law if it is neces-
sary. Therefore, not all parts of the law have to be ruled by parliamentary stat-
utes. Nevertheless, courts have to apply statutes of parliament if these have been 
adopted. Therefore one can argue that parliament did not want to enact a rem-
edy for the breach of privacy. In that case the courts might respect the will of 
the legislature. It is true that neither the Privacy Act nor the Broadcasting Stan-
dards Act provide such a remedy, but does that inevitably mean that parliament 
was not willing to enact this remedy? As the long title of the Privacy Act says it 
deals with "the collection, use, and disclosure, by public and private sector 
agencies, of information relating to individuals."87 In this context private sector 
agencies are of interest in particular. Is a newspaper such a private sector 
agency? In context of other provisions of the Act it is not. The Act understands 
private sector agencies in a way of private companies, which usually receive 
and store personal data of others. This could be a bank, which stores data about 
their clients or a hospital, which stores data about their patients. The Privacy 
Act regulates the procedures under which these agencies have to handle this 
personal information. It does not regulate what happens if somebody receives 
personal information without the consent of the person concerned. However, 
this is the issue a tort of privacy is dealing with. Therefore the Privacy act does 
not contain a decision of parliament not to establish the named tort. 
The Broadcasting Standards Act governs the way television operates in 
New Zealand. The Act's primary focus is programme standards, the establish-
ment of New Zealand On Air and regulation of election programmes.88 The 
purpose of this act is not the regulation of the relation between the media and 
other private persons, but the way the broadcasting media in New Zealand work 
and which standards their programmes have to fulfil. It ensures a certain level of 
quality in the media in New Zealand. So the Broadcasting Standards Act does 
not deal with the question of remedies in cases of invasion of privacy. Thus it 
87 Privacy Act, long title 
88 <http://www.nztbc.co. nz/regulatory/> (last access O I. 12. 2003). 
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does not contain a decision of parliament against the named tort either. More-
over, the principles developed on the grounds of the Broadcasting Standards Act 
by the Broadcasting Standards Authority establish nearly the same test as devel-
oped by Nicholson J in P v D. Certainly these principles apply only to the 
broadcasting media and not to print media and newspapers. Nevertheless, the 
existence of these principles shows that the proposed protection of privacy in-
terests is not as unfamiliar for the New Zealand media as Randerson J suggests. 
Why should freedom of expression have a bigger impact on print media than on 
broadcasting media? These principles show that freedom of expression does not 
inevitably outweigh privacy interests. If the broadcasting media have to respect 
privacy interest, the newspapers have to fulfil the same requirements. Since 
there is no statute, which shows clearly a denial of the tort by parliament, the 
fundamental principle of the common law should come into force. This means 
that courts are entitled to develop the law if it is necessary. As aforementioned 
the establishment of a tort of privacy is necessary under the contemporary cir-
cumstances, because the New Zealand law does not provide sufficient protec-
tion of privacy interests. 
7. The analysis of the facts of the Hosking case 
Randerson J did not only conclude that the claim of the Hoskings must 
fail, because he is not recognising a tort of invasion of privacy by disclosure of 
private facts. Although he denies the existence of this tort, he concludes that the 
facts of the Hosking case do not fit in the previous decisions of the High court 
dealing with matters of privacy. This conclusion seems to be a little bit odd. On 
the one hand the judge denies the existence of the named tort, but on the other 
hand he proves the existence of this tort by considering the possibility that the 
facts of the Hosking case could fulfil the requirements of the four-step-test in-
troduced in P v D. 
The conclusion that the Hosking case does not fit with the previous deci-
sions depends mainly on three reasons. Firstly the taken photographs did not 
show private facts at all. They were taken in a public place right before Christ-
mas:89 
89 Hosking v Runting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527 /02 Randerson J [ 137]. 
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I accept Mr Miles' submission that the Newmarket shopping centre on a 
Saturday morning shortly before Christmas would be the last place one 
would seek solitude or seclusion. 
The broad public was able to see the children and their mother pushing the 
stroller. Therefore, the photographs could not be classified as private facts . 
Moreover, the photographs were neither highly offensive nor objectionable to 
reasonable person. They show Mrs Hoskings pushing a stroller along a shop-
ping street. Maybe "the faces of the children are visible, but not very promi-
nent."90 The photographs are depicting everyday activities, which everyone has 
seen very often. Lastly, in the opinion of Randerson J, the Hoskings as public 
figures cannot expect the same degree of privacy as ordinary members of soci-
ety can:91 
Viewed objectively, as it must be, the reasonable expectations of privacy of 
such persons will necessarily be lower since it is inevitable the media will 
subject celebrity figures such as Mr Hosking to closer scrutiny than others 
and because the public has a natural curiosity and interest not only in the 
personal lives and activities of the celebrities but also in their families. 
Randerson J concludes his judgement in this context: 92 
1 also find that the plaintiffs' case does not fulfil the criteria set out in previ-
ous decisions of this court, which have held there is a tort of invasion of 
privacy arising from the public disclosure of private information. 
This finding on the facts of the Hosking case is accompanied by a general con-
clusion on the issue of a tort of privacy. Given there is a tort of invasion of pri-
vacy by public disclosure of private facts, this tort covers the unauthorised inva-
sion of the private and domestic sphere of another person, but does it also apply 
to the publication of photographs taken in a public place? Randerson J held in 
this context:93 
90 Hosking v Runting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 136) . 
91 Hosking v Runting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 141). 
92 Hosking v Runting [2003) High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 184). 
93 Hosking v Runting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 183). 
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The plaintiffs' claim must fail since the law in New Zealand does not rec-
ognise a tortious cause of action in privacy based on the publication of pho-
tographs taken in a public place. 
While Randerson J is right in his analysis that the Hosking case does 
not fit with the requirements of the test established by Nicholson J, this 
fact shows that the New Zealand privacy law has to be developed fur-
ther on. To ensure a sufficient protection of privacy, in particular of 
the privacy of children, the common law has to provide a tort, which 
protects the privacy of children, under certain circumstances even 
when they appear in public places. As the German law recognises un-
der certain circumstances privacy interests in public places, the New 
Zealand law should follow in this aspect. Even in these situations pri-
vacy interests may outweigh the public interest in the publication of 
this information. 
C. The Privacy Rights of Children 
Another issue Randerson J raised in his judgement is the question if the 
privacy of children weighs heavier than the privacy of adults: 94 
Of course, this case relates to the privacy of the children, not to their par-
ents. The question is, does that make a difference. 
He acknowledges "that children are vulnerable members of our society and that 
courts, as well as other public institutions, have to regard to their best interests 
as a primary consideration."95 This statement is founded on the United Nations 
Convention on the Right of the Child 1989 ('Children's Convention'), adopted 
by New Zealand in 1993:96 
2. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful at-
tacks on his or her honour and reputation. 
94 Hosking v Runting (2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 142). 
95 Hosking v Runting (2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 147). 
96 Convention on the Rights of the Chi Id. Art 16. 
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3. The child has the right to the protection of the law against such inter-
ference. 
The importance of the welfare of children and the duty of state authorities to 
protect and promote this welfare is supported by another provision of the 
'Children's Convention':97 
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or pri-
vate welfare institutions courts of law, administrative authorities or leg-
islative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consid-
eration. 
2. States parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as 
is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and 
duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally 
responsible for him or her, and, to this end shall take appropriate legis-
lative and administrative matters. 
Article 16 of the 'Children's Convention' is identical to Article 17 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976 with the only difference 
that Article 16 applies to both children and adults. Therefore, the judge empha-
sises the fact that children enjoy the same protection of their privacy as adults. 
All causes of action dealing with the protection of the private sphere apply 
completely to children. Moreover, Randerson J notices that the New Zealand 
Press Council accepted the need for the protection of children in particular:
98 
Editors should have particular care and consideration for reporting on and 
about children and young people. 
Nevertheless, also in cases in which children are involved everything comes 
down to a balancing with other competing rights, in particular the freedom of 
speech of the media.99 
In this case Randerson J held that the freedom of expression enjoyed by 
the media outweighs the right to privacy of the children of Mr and Mrs Hosking. 
97 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 3. 
98 Statement of Principles of the New Zealand Press Council, r. 5. 
99 Hosking v Rwzting [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [147]. 
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The main reason for this conclusion is the previous public behaviour in relation 
to the children. The parents have published information about the IVF-
treatment, the names of the children and the fact that they have been born as 
twins. All this has awaken the public interest. Moreover, the position of Mr 
Hosking as a TV-star and his way to arouse publicity has created public interest 
not only in his life, but also in the life of his family. Maybe not everyone is in-
terested in these stories: 100 
But it must be recalled that it is not for the court in cases such as this to de-
cide what is appropriate for people to see or to act as some form of judicial 
censor. 
Therefore, the judge concludes that even if he had accepted the alleged right of 
privacy, it would have been clearly overwhelmed by the freedom of expression. 
This statement has to be examined. 
1. An examination of the privacy of children 
Although the judgement of Randerson J addresses a lot of issues con-
nected to the law of privacy it deals with the privacy of children in particular. 
This depends on the facts of the Hosking case. Generally, the judge does not 
recognise a tort of breach of privacy at all. In context of the privacy of children, 
he says that they enjoy the same protection of other remedies as adults. If he had 
accepted a general right to privacy it would have been clearly overwhelmed by 
the right to freedom of expression. The issue seems to be a little bit more com-
plicated. 
There is no statutory guaranteed right to privacy in New Zealand, but as 
aforementioned the New Zealand law recognises several privacy interests. This 
is supported by the ICCPR, which was adopted by New Zealand in 1979:
101 
I. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 
100 Hosking v Ruming [2003] High Court Auckland CP 527/02 Randerson J [ 152]. 
101 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 17. 
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2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such inte
r-
ference or attacks. 
Randerderson J reasoned that the existing remedies provide sufficient protecticm
 
against this interference and fulfil therefore the obligation set out in Ar
t 17. As 
aforementioned this opinion is wrong. The existing remedies in New Zea
land do 
not provide protection, which covers all privacy interests. Therefore, th
e estab-
lishment of a tort of privacy is required by Art 17 ICCPR. 
The fact that Art 16 of the 'Children's Convention' states exactly the
 
same rights for children emphasises the particular importance of the pr
ivacy of 
children. Randerson J recognises the vulnerability and weak position of childre
n 
in modem society. He mentions several New Zealand statutes, which 
dealing 
with this aspect.
102 This issue must be emphasised. Children are the weakest 
members of our society. They are not able to decide in their best inter
ests and 
need time to learn the rules of the game. Therefore, an undisturbed envir
onment 
is very important, in which the children can develop their intellect an
d skills. 
This environment is endangered, if children become part of the public. 
Perhaps 
the person is not able to stop this publicity, when she or he is in an age, i
n which 
she or he can decide on its own, if she or he wants to be a public figure. 
There is 
always the danger of a slippery slope and it is possible that the perso
n is not 
able to stop a development that started when she or he was not able to de
cide for 
her or himself. If the child is not able to decide, this responsibility lies wi
th the 
parents: 
103 
l. State Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the 
principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbrin
g-
ing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, leg
al 
guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and deve
l-
opment of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic co
n-
cern. 
102 For example: the Guardianship Act 1968 and the Children, Young Perso
ns and Their Fami-
lies Act l 989. 
103 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 18. 
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This rule states definitely that the parents have the responsibility for the up-
bringing and the education of the child. They are acting in good faith and try to 
achieve the best interest of the child. As long as a child is not able to make own 
decisions, the parents decide on behalf of the children. One can argue that the 
provisions of international conventions such as the 'Children· s Convention· 
only address to state authorities and cannot apply to private litigation. 1 ow. Art 
18 of the 'Children's Convention' establishes the obligation that State Parties 
shall ensure the recognition of the rights of the parent . Therefore. the govern-
ment has to provide a legal framework, in which no one infringe the right of 
the parents. If private persons infringe these rights, the government ha to en-
sure that there are effective remedies preventing this infringement. In thi ea e. 
the New Zealand government is obligated to invent a common law remedy. 
which provides sufficient protection of the rights of the parent set out in Art 1 
of the 'Children's Convention'. This is supported by two other provi ion of the 
'Children's Convention':
104 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative. administrati\"e, ocial 
and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical 
or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment. mal-
treatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, \\ hile in the care of par-
ent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person\\ ho has the care of the child. 
Originally the provision establishe protection for the child against the abu e of 
the parents. Nevertheless, it can be read as an obligation for State Partie to 
support parents in the protection of their children. If parents are not able to pro-
tect their children from one of the abuses named above, the government ha to 
establish effective remedies, which support the parent . In thi case the prohibi-
tion of the exploitation of the children could apply. The issue of exploitation of 
children is emphasised by another provision of the -Children's Con ention·:
10
: 
States Parties shall protect the child against all other forms of exploitation 
prejudicial to any aspects of the child's welfare. 
104 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 19. 
105 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art 19. 
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Therefore the New Zealand law has to provide an effective remedy for the 
breach of privacy interests, in particular for the breach of privacy of children. 
D. The rehearing of the Hosking case in the Court of Appeal 
Therefore, the Hoskings pleaded in a rehearing on the case in the Court of 
Appeal for the extension of the tort of invasion of privacy to a tort of unauthor-
ised invasion of privacy, which also applies to the publication of photographs of 
children without the consent of the parents. The appellants argued that there is a 
gap in the New Zealand law without this extension, because the established 
causes of action do not cover all possible breaches of privacy. This leads to a 
breach of New Zealand's international obligations under the 'Children's Con-
vention' .106 
According to the appellants Randerson J failed to weigh the privacy in-
terests of the children in section 21 and section 18 BORA against the free 
speech interests in section 23.
107 The taking of the photographs was an unrea-
sonable search and seizure of information about the children.
108 The publication 
of the photographs and the subsequent interest of the media leads to a situation, 
in which the parents avoid the appearance of the children in the public. Accord-
ing to the appellants this is the only way to protect the children from serious 
harm and to enable them to live a normal life in the future. This then leads to a 
breach of the children's freedom of movement.
109 
Moreover, the appellants argued that the judgement of Randerson J is a 
breach of Article 16 and Article 19 and 36 of the Children's Convention. Article 
16 protects the privacy of children and Article 19 and 36 prohibit the exploita-
tion of children. The publication of the photographs of the children means an 
economical exploitation and thus a breach of Article 19 and 36.
110 
IOb Hoski11g v Runti11g Court of Appeal 101/03 Appellants submissions, p4. 
107 Hosking v R11111i11g Court of Appeal 101/03 Appellants submissions, p5. 
108 Hosking v Ru11ti11g Court of Appeal l O 1/03 Appellants submissions, p5. 
109 Hosking v Runting Court of Appeal I O 1/03 Appellant submissions, p 11. 
110 Hosking v Ru11ti11g Court of Appeal l O 1/03 Appellants submissions, p 16. 
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1. The argument of the respondents 
The respondents argued that the New Zealand legal framework does not 
provide a legal action such as the appellants proposes. While the NZBORA pro-
tects the freedom of expression in section 23, it does not contain a protection of 
the general right of privacy. 111 Thus, the impact of freedom of expression 
clearly overwhelms the right to privacy of the children. The tort of invasion of 
privacy by the disclosure of private facts does not apply, because the publication 
does not deal with private facts. 112 Moreover these facts are neither highly of-
fensive nor objectionable. 113 The existing remedies fulfil New Zealand's inter-
national obligations under the Children's Convention, so there is no need for a 
new remedy. 114 
2. A six-step test for the protection of the privacy of children 
According to their argument the appellants proposed the extension of a 
tort of privacy in the case of the publication of photographs depicting children. 
To avoid all inconsistencies with the international obligations and to provide 
sufficient protection of the children the appellants suggested the invention of a 
six-step test: 
1. The children must be identifiable in the photographs; 
2. The photographs shall not be published in absence of the consent of the 
parents; 
3. The case shall be assessed without regard to the position of the parents; 
4. There shall be no reason for the publication in the behaviour of the 
child; 
5. The court shall regard the impact of freedom of speech; 
6. The case shall be assessed in the best interests of the child. 
111 Hosking v Runting Court of Appeal 101/03 Submissions on Behalf of the defendants, p.6. 
11 2 Hosking v Runting Court of Appeal l O 1/03 Submissions on Behalf of the defendants, p.10. 
113 Hosking v Runting Court of Appeal 101/03 Submissions on Behalf of the defendants, p.12. 
114 Hosking v Runting Court of Appeal l O 1/03 Submissions on Behalf of the defendants, p.32. 
(a) The children mu t be identifiable in the photograph 
The first step ensures that there is an i sue at all. If the hildren are not 
identifiable in the photographs. there i no problem. either the parent would 
be concerned, nor could one consider the di closure of private information. If 
the depicted person i not recogni able. one hard!_ can a} it i pri\ ate informa-
tion about a person. 
(b) Absence of the consent of the parent 
This requirement addresses the right of the parents to bring up their chil-
dren. It recognises that the parents have the right to decide on behalf of hildren 
as long as they are not able to make their own deci ions. !\1oreover, it re pect 
the specific position of children in society. The need for a higher degree of pro-
tection of the privacy of children is matched by thi requirement. The parent 
shall decide, which information should be published about the child. Thi en-
sures that the parents are able to protect the pri acy of their children in a suffi-
cient way. The German Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged the rights of 
the parents in a similar way holding that the Federal Court of Ju tice failed to 
weigh the rights of the parents set out in Article 6 of the Ba ic Law. In ea e of 
the privacy of children freedom of expression has to be balanced again t the 
privacy interests of the children and the right of the parents to up bring their 
children. This is underpinned by the provisions set out in the ·children' 
convention'. 
(c) Assessment without regard to the position of the parents 
This requirement is of particular concern in the Hosking case. Randerson 
J found that the children of the Hos kings couldn't expect the same level of pro-
tection of privacy as anybody Iese, since Mr Hosking is a public figure. There-
fore, there is a legitimate interest not only in the person of Mr Hosking, but also 
in his family. Following this opinion any relative of a celebrity would be a pub-
lic figure itself. This concept seems to be a little bit too broad. As aforemen-
tioned the German Federal Constitutional Court held that children of celebrities 
are not inevitably public figures. It still depends on the behaviour of the person 
itself, if she or he can be described as public figure. If a person avoids the ap-
pearance in the public at all, one cannot assess her or him as public figure. In 
the case of children this assessment has to be handled carefully, because of their 
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weak position in society. In this context it means that the privacy of the children 
has to be handled independently from the privacy issues of their parents. 
(d) No reason for the publication in the behaviour of the child 
This requirement gives respect for the competing right of freedom of 
expression of the media and recognises a legitimate public interests in the publi-
cation of the inforrnat10n. It is quite similar to the concept of a public figure for 
limited purposes in the German law. If there is a reason in the behaviour of the 
child or the circumstances the photographs were taken in, there might be a le-
gitimate public interest in the publication of the photographs. 
( e) Impact of freedom of speech 
This step provides a general basis for a balancing of the competing 
rights of the involved parties. While Randerson J thought Freedom of expres-
sion would always outweigh the privacy interests of the other party, this step 
provides a case-by-case balancing. This leads to a much better balancing of the 
named rights. 
(f) Assessment in the best interest of the child 
The last step regards the importance of the protection of children. It rec-
ognises the international obligations established in the 'Children's Convention'. 
Moreover it is a counterbalance to step two and the right of the parents to de-
cide, which information should be published. The parents shall agree with the 
publication in the case that the publication is in the best interest in the child. 
This avoids that parents decide rather in their own interests than in the interests 
of the child. 
Concluding the proposed test provides an adequate remedy for breaches 
of privacy of children by publication of photographs. This aim cannot be 
reached by a development of other existing remedies. As aforementioned no 
existing remedy can be developed in a way that provides sufficient protection of 
privacy. Privacy interests need a unique protection, which fit to the specific re-
quirements of breaches of privacy. The test emphasises the importance of the 
private sphere of children and ensure the opportunity for the parents to bring 
their children up in save and quiet environment. Therefore, it establishes an ef-
43 
fective remedy to fulfil the international obligations of New Zealand. On the 
other hand it respects the right to freedom of expression enjoyed by the media, 
but it does not disregard the import issue of privacy at all. It provides a public 
interest test and a general basis for a case-by-case balancing of the competing 
rights. Therefore it weighs both privacy interests and freedom of expression in 
an adequate way. It establishes a well-balanced system of protection of privacy 
interests and allows in case-by-case decisions exemptions, if there is an impor-
tant public interest in the information. This test establishes in fact a system, 
which produces quite similar results as the German approach. 
Perhaps this test should be considered in relation to the publication of 
information of any kind about children, not only photographs. The need for the 
protection of the children's privacy is the same in case of publication of private 
information. Since the test provides a good balancing of the competing rights, 
there is no reason why it should not apply to all cases concerned with the publi-
cation of private information of children. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Geiman law provides an extensive protection of privacy. It depends 
on the general right to one's own persona Ii ty. This right is based on a complex 
legal framework of constitutional rights, tort law and the right to control one's 
own image. Therefore, this high level of protection is consistent with the Ger-
man legal system and it provides a sufficient protection of the privacy of chil-
dren in particular. 
Unfortunately the situation in the laws of New Zealand is not that clear. 
Since Randerson J' s denial of a tort of invasion of privacy by disclosure of pri-
vate facts the situations seems to be quite uncertain. Do the existing remedies, 
breach of confidence in particular provide sufficient protection for privacy in-
terests, or is there a need for a tort of invasion of privacy? Who should establish 
such a tort: parliament or the courts? Is the privacy of children of particular con-
cern and does it need more protection than the privacy of adults? 
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The conclusion of Randerson J that in context of the protection of pri-
vacy interests the tort of breach of confidence should be developed is definitely 
wrong. This tort is designed to protect a relationship of confidence. The range of 
privacy interests is much wider. Also the other existing remedies do not protect 
all aspects of privacy. Therefore, a tort has to be established. which protects 
privacy issues in particular. The four-step test developed in P v D for a tort of 
invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts is a useful basis for the 
development of the law of privacy in ew Zealand. It will be interesting to see 
how this issue will be developed in the following years . 
In context of the privacy of children the specific importance of this issue 
must be emphasised. Children need a save and quiet environment so that they 
can develop uninterrupted by the interference of others. Therefore. children 
need a higher degree of protection than adults. While adults are able to decide. 
in which way they want to appear in the public domain. children are not able to 
decide that on their own. Supported by the international obligations in the 'chil-
dren's Convention' the parents have to decide. in which way information about 
their children should be published. The six-step test proposed by the appellants 
in the hearing of the Hosking case at the Court of Appeal provides an interesting 
framework to decide these cases. On the one hand it emphasises the importance 
of the interests of the children, but on the other hand it respects the right to free-
dom of expression in two ways . It expressly suggests a balancing of the compet-
ing rights and it states a public interest consideration in the step 'behaviour of 
the child'. 
Moreover, a similar test could be considered to treat privacy issues of 
adults. While the privacy interests of children are of particular importance. al o 
the privacy rights of adults have to be protected sufficiently. The test developed 
by Nicholson J is just a first step, but it does not cover all privacy interests. 
Therefore a test should be developed, which depends 0:1 the consent of the de-
picted person. As in the case of children, this test ha to provide exemptions in 
which the photograph may be published without consent. when there is an im-
portant public interest in the publication. This public interest can occur in the 
cases of celebrities, special events and specific behaviour of the person. After 
45 
all a test like this would bring the level of protection to a similar level achieved 
in Germany. 
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